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iIIN'ESOT_4 LAW REVIEW

DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE POWER OF REVIEW
IN COURT-MARTIAL PROCEEDINGS
NOT THE least interesting of the problems which are involved
in the administration of military law is the question of former
jeopardy.
The question has been brought to public notice by a widespread criticism of the present practice of sending cases back
to courts-martial for revision even after findings of not guilty,
and of allowing not only new and higher sentences to be imposed
on the revision but an entire change of front and a verdict or
finding of guilty, and in fact of recommending and almost ordering these sentences.
This practice prevails in spite -of the constitutional provision:

"Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." I
It prevails in spite of the 40th Article of War, which provides that:
"No person shall be tried a second time for the same
offense." 2
1 Art. V, Amend. Const.
2 The extent to which this practice has been carried is shown by

the following exhibit which was filed by General Crowder in his
testimony before the Committee on Military Affairs of the United
States Senate, in February, 1919.
"From the commencement of the war to October 1, 1918, a total
of approximately 2,500 cases were returned by reviewing authorities
for revision. This nunber comprises all cases returned, including
those returned for correction of clerical errors, revision upward of
inadequate sentences, and acquittals.
"From these 2,500 cases, the first 1,000 records were examined for
the purpose of securing the following data. That is to say, approximately 40 per cent of all cases returned by reviewing authorities for
revision have been scrutinized.
"'Out of the 1,000 cases thus examined, it appears that 95 of the
cases were ones in which the court had returned a verdict of acquittal: 39 of these 95 cases were returned for the purpose of having the
court make purely formal correction of the record, leaving a balance
of 56 cases of acquittals returned by the reviewing authorities for
a reconsideration of a verdict of acquittal.
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It prevails in spite of the statement in the Manual for CourtsMartial that "Where a person subject to military law has been
once duly convicted or acquitted by a court-martial he has been
'tried' in the sense of the article [No. 40], and can not be tried
again, against his will, for the same offense, or for any included
offense, and it is inmmaterial whether the conviction or acquittal
has been approved or disapproved." 3

It exists in spite of the fact that the only reported opinions
of the Judge Advocate General upon the subject, and which alone
are cited by the text writers, hold conclusively that it is illegal.4
"In 38 of these 56 cases the court adhered to its former finding
of not guilty. That is to say, in 2 out of every 3 cases of acquittal
returned for reconsideration the court adhered to its original finding.
The remaining 18 cases of acquittal returned for revision are the
subject matter of the following synopsis. Sixteen of these cases are
those of enlisted men; 2 of officers.
"The case referred to above in which it was said that dishonorable
discharge and a long period of confinement were inflicted after an
acquittal is, without doubt, the case of Recruit David Cortesini. An
analysis of that case appears in the attached synopsis marked (1).
The final outcome of that case was a sentence of confinement for one
month and forfeiture of one-third pay for a like period.
"An analysis of the 18 cases referred to discloses that the total
confinement in all cases amounted to 27 months. In 2 cases confinement of 6 months was imposed, but in 11 cases no confinement whatever was imposed. The average confinement for the 18 cases was
1.5 months. This, of course, completely refutes the charge that long
terms of coninement have been inflicted by courts in cases in which
there was at first an acquittal.
"In 3 of the 18 cases discussed in this synopsis all punishment was
remitted by the reviewing authority. It therefore appears that out
of 1,000 cases returned by reviewing authorities, or 40 per cent of
all cases returned to October 1, 1918, there were 14 cases of original
acquittal in which the court in revision changed its finding, imposing
an average confinement of 1.5 months."
• See page 68 of Manual for Courts-Martial which was revised in
the Judge Advocate General's Office and published by authority of
the Secretary of War in 1917. Italics are the writer's.
4 "Where the accused has been once duly convicted or acquitted.
he has been 'tried' in the seise of the article, and can not be tried
again against his will, though no action whatever be taken upon
the proceedings by the reviewing authority (R. 31, 300. Apr., 1871);
or, though the proceedings, findings (and sentence, if any) be wholly
disapproved by him. R. 9, 611. Sept., 1864: 27.348. Nov., 1868, and
605, Apr.. 1869: 38, 38, Apr., 1876: P. 60. 177. June. 1893: C. 16,814.
Apr. 29. 1907. It is immaterial whether the former conviction or
acquittal was approved or disapproved. P. 36, 259, Nov., 1889."
Howland. Digest of Opinions of Judge Advocates General of the
Army. 167. CII A 1.
To this paragraph there is attached the footnote:
Compare
?Iacomh. Sec. 159: O'Brien. 277: Rules for Bombay Army, 45:McNaughton. 132. 133.
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Upon this subject and in reviewing the popular criticisms
upon the administration of military justice during the war. Judge
Advocate General E. H. Crowder says:
"This power undoubtedly does exist; and it is occasionally
exercised.
"The reviewing authority, i. e., ordinarily the commanding
general who has convened the court, represents essentially a
first appellate stage. No sentence of court-martial can be carried
into execution until it has been approved by the reviewing authoritv, i.e., neither acquittal nor conviction is effective until the
reviewing authority has scrutinized the record and given it
approval. The very object of this institution is to secure the
due application of the law, and to surround the accused with an
additional protection independent of the trial court. This power
to approve -or disapprove a finding is given great flexibility by
the Articles of War; it includes the power to approve a finding
of guilty of a lesser offense and the power to approve or disapprove the whole or any part of the sentence. In this respect the
military appellate code differs from the usual civil code. Incidentally, this power to disapprove includes the power to disapprove a sentence of acquittal and to return the record for reconsideration by the court. But, intrinsically, nothing more is here
implied than that the court is to reconvene and reconsider its
judgment freely and independently. It is in no sense a measure
which subjects the court-martial to the command of the reviewing
authority in framing the tenor of its judgment upon such reconsideration: for the court is, under the law, entirely at liberty
to adhere to its original decision.
"That this power is a useful one, and that it is not in fact
in any appreciable number of cases so exercised as to amount
to an abuse of the commanding general's military prestige, will,
I think, appear from the figures to be gathered from the records.
In the first place, the power is exercised in the vast majority
of cases solely for the purpose of making formal corrections of
the record: for example, to enable the fact to be shown, if it was
a fact, that a certain member of the court was present or was
qualified or that a witness was sworn, or the like formal, correction which will make the record of the trial correspond to the
facts. In the second place, the exercise of the power in cases
of an initial judgment of acquittal has been rare indeed: and in
those few cases the trial court, far from exhibiting a supple
-obedience to the supposed hint of the commanding officer, has,
in the great majority of cases, adhered to its original judgment." i
Military Justice During the War, p. 32 (War Dept. pamphlet).
Colonel Beverly A. Read, Chief of the Military Justice Division of
the Judge Advocate General's Department, testifying before the Committee of the American Bar Association in April, 1918, among other
things, said:
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In spite of his positive assertion that "the power undoubtedly exists," even General Crowder does not claim that there is
any express warrant for its exercise in the constitution or even
in the Articles of War themselves.6 . It is and can be asserted
only on the theory that the jeopardy clause of the constitution is
"The idea about returning for retrial is based on the theory, I
suppose, the belief, that after the court has concluded its labors that
is the end of the trial, while the action of a court-martial is not final
until it has been passed upon by the reviewing authorities. In other
words, he is part of the judicial system. As has been frequently
stated, the whole . . . and quoting the Supreme Court in the
Runkle case, 122 U. S., where they held that the whole proceeding
is judicial in character tip through and including the President. That
is a remarkable situation, that a great many people are not advised
in regard to. A record which goes up to the President for review
in case of death or dismissal under this provision of the 48th Article
of War which refers to him-he acts there in a judicial capacity, not
in an administrative capacity, but in a judicial capacity. You will
find that squarely laid down in the Runkle case.
"Mr. Bruce: The Manual at one place seems to intimate that a
man has been in jeopardy, when a judgment has been rendered by a
court-martial whether confirmed or not"Col. Read (interposing): That is true. They have held that if
the proceedings of the court have gone to a finding and sentence, or a
finding and an acquittal, he could not be tried again, because that
would violate not only the 40th Article of War, but the 5th Amendment to the constitution for that matter.
"Col. Hinkley: Let me read into the record a section of the
court-martial that I think this has reference to: from page 68 of
the 'Manual for Courts-Martial' and in the portion relating to pleas
there, being paragraph 149, the subsection (3a), 'the 40th Article
of War': 'No person shall be tried a second time for the same
offense.' Then the explanatory section (b) goes on: 'where a person
subject to military law has been once duly convicted or acquitted
by a court-martial he has been "tried" in the sense of the article,
and can not be tried again, against his will for the same offense,
or for any included offense, and it is immaterial whether the conviction or acquittal has been approved or disapproved.' ....
"Col. Read: It is not a trial de novo. The reviewing authority had simply found itself unable to concur in the action of the court and upon
his reading of the record he is of the opinion for the reasons set out
by him that the court erred in the findings and acquittal, and his
endorsement returning the record directs a revision by the court, a
reconsideration by the court, in view of these suggestions which he
makes. Now, the court, as I said, is at perfect liberty to disregard
the suggestions of the reviewing authority and to adhere to his prior
action in the case, and I only spoke practically from my knowledge.
In the regular army they almost uniformly decline to change their
action. The form of action is usually respectfully returned with the
endorsement 'the court adheres to its former findings and acquittal'
and that is the end of it."
0 Testifying before the Committee on Military Affairs of the United
States Senate, in February, 1919, General Crowder said: "And this
brings up the main question: Is it right, is the present rule right,
the present rule authorizing the reconsideration of the verdict of
acquittal? Let me say first, it is simply a regulation and there is no
law under which it is done. The War Depar-tment could wipe out
the regulation to-night, and could establish this very prohibition by
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not binding upon the military branch of the government; that
the "revision" is not "a new trial" within the meaning of Section
40 of the Articles of War, and that a court-martial is not a court
or a judicial body but an administrative agency merely.
This theory is expressed in the Digest of the Opinions of
the Judge Advocate General which was published in 1912, where
we find a reference to an opinion which was filed in July, 1895,
and which was probably never printed but has the card reference
of 1495. This states that "the principle of the fifth amendment
in the constitution, but not the amendment itself, applies to courtmartial trials, as a part of our common law military. As Section
860, R. S., does not apply to courts-martial, it does not set aside
the general principle which with courts-martial takes the place
of the constitutional provision, but whether it applies or not an
accused on trial before a court-martial cannot, when testifying
as a witness in his own behalf, be compelled to criminate himself as to an offense in respect to which he has not testified."
It was expressed by General Bell in the case of the recruit
David Cortesini, to which we shall afterwards refer, when in
his order sending the matter back to the court-martial for a
revision, after a verdict of "not guilty," he said:
"In the present case the accused was given every opportunity
to obey the order, but nevertheless disobeyed it intentionally, in
defiance of authority, and accordingly such disobedience was
'wilful' within the meaning of this section.
"The reviewing authority does not intend to give the impression that he personally believes that the accused must be required
to serve a long period of confinement for this act, but rather
he desires the court to understand that the commission of this
act should be met by severe punishment, and then, if in this case
there are reasons why the sentence should be reduced, such
reduction should be ordered on the action of the reviewing
authority rather than in the inadequate sentence awarded by a
court appointed as an executive agency in the administration of
discipline." 7

an order." The prohibition under discussion was contained in a
proposed hill and was to the effect that "When a court-martial shall
find the accused not guilty upon all charges and specifications, it
shall not reconsider, nor shall the appointing authority direct it to
reconsider its findings."
7 See Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs of the
United States Senate on Senate Bill 5320, published in 1919. p. 247,
also record Judge Advocate General's Department, No. 116234.
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The question to be determined is whether the officers and
soldiers of our army are entitled to the protection of the constitution or whether they are not, and the position of the military
authorities evidently is that they are not. In their opinion a
court-martial is merely an agency "appointed" by the commanding officer for the training of the soldiers in discipline, and though
one is sentenced by such a tribunal to death or to a long term
of imprisonment, he is not deprived of life or liberty or in fact
punished at all, but merely trained and educated and disciplined.
A criminal sentence in the army, in short, serves the same purpose as the manual of arms or the setting up exercises, and must
be cheerfully acquiesced in, no matter how severe it may be, as
it is but a part of the school of the soldier. If this states the law
and the military contention, we then have the situation of a
military code and practice which, except where Congress has
expressly spoken, is based on a military common law, that is
to say, the usages of war, the opinions of the military commanders and of the judge advocates and military departments,
and which is outside of and uncontrolled by the constitution. It
presents a system which may recognize the constitutional provisions or the constitutional analogy, but considers itself not
bound to do so.
This we believe can hardly have been the intention of the
founders of our government, or even of the Congress which
in 1916 passed the so-called Articles of War. Followed to its
logical conclusion, the theory implies that the military law is not
even subject to Congress, for what but the constitution gave to
Congress the power to legislate at all? Can it be that a nation
that was conversant with the Mutiny Acts and the determined
efforts through the centuries of the English Parliament and of
the English people to subordinate the Military to the Civil, when
they solemnly adopted a series of constitutional amendments as
an expression of fundamental rights and as an expressed limitation upon the powers of the new government which they were
creating, ever could have intended that the only persons to be
denied these constitutional rights should be the men who were
called to the national colors to defend the nation thus created?
It is true that Section 8 of Article I of the constitution gives to
Congress the power "to raise and support armies, to provide and
maintain a navy and to make rules for the government of the
land and naval forces," but surely it was the intention that these
powers as well as all of the other powers granted by the article

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

should be exercised in conformity both with the spirit and the
actual conditions and restraints of the constitution, and it is to
be noticed that these powers are given to Congress and not to
any military chief. The first ten amendments, indeed, were
limitations and amendments to the whole of the constitution, and
not to any particular part thereof. That they were intended to
cover the military as well as the civil portion of the population
is clear from Articles II and III, which limit the power of military control and the rules for the disposition and government of
the military, by providing that the exercise of the powers conferred shall not deprive the states of the right to maintain their
own militia, nor involve the right of quartering soldiers in time
of peace. It is true that Article V of the amendments in express
terms provides that the right to a presentment or indictment by
a grand jury shall not extend to cases arising in the land or
naval forces or in the militia when in actual service in time of
war or public danger, but this limitation is restricted to the
presentment or indictment, and the language is explicit and
unlimited which provides: "Nor shall any person be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." It is noticeable indeed that this provision does
not in terms refer io criminal prosecutions alone, and in order
that it shall apply to the men in the army it is not necessary that
a court-martial proceeding should be technically called a criminal
proceeding or a criminal trial, for the words are merely: "Nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb."
It may possibly be that if a court-martial is not a criminal
prosecution, but merely a means of enforcing discipline, a defendant might be compelled to testify against himself, as the article
provides: "Nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself," but no such restrictive words are used
when it comes to the question of jeopardy, and there is doubt
even as to the first proposition, since the Supreme Court has
held that a conviction in a court-martial is a bar to a prosecution
in a civil court for the same offense. 8
s Grafton v. United States, (1907) 206 U. S. 333, 51 L. Ed. 1084,
27 S. C. R. 749.
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It also will be noticed that the Articles of War everywhere
provide that the punishment shall be such as the court-martial
and not the commanding officer may direct, and that the trial
shall be had before the court-martial, and not the commanding
officer, and that no person shall be twice tried for the same
offense.
That the practice is anomalous, indeed, seems to be fully
recognized by the military authorities, for they all appear to agree
that on the review or rehearing no new evidence can be taken, 9
and by this theory they attempt to meet the objection that
Article 40 of the Articles of War expressly provides that no new
trial shall be had. This quibble, however, does not meet the
added objection that the constitution does not content itself with
merely providing that no person shall be twice tried, but distinctly states that no person shall be twice placed in jeopardy.
It is also freely admitted that there is no express authorization for the practice to be found anywhere in the Articles of
'"Tar,"" which, it may be observed, in so far at least as the
clauses in regard to review are concerned, were enacted by
Congress in 1916, and superseded any prior rules, regulations,
or military practices upon the matter. 1 It must, indeed, be
9See testimony of Colonel Read in note 5, ante.

30 See note 4, ante.
1" These Articles, among other things, provide:
Art. 14. - . . . . Provided, That when the summary court
officer is also the commanding officer no sentence . . . . shall
be carried into execution, until the same shall have been approved
by superior authority."

Art. 40.

"No person shall be tried a second time for the same

offense."
Art. 46. "No sentence of a court-martial shall be carried into
execution until the.same shall have been approved by the officer
appointing the court or by the officer commanding for the time being."
Art. 47. "The power to approve the sentence of a court-martial
shall be held to include:
"(a) The power to approve or disapprove a finding and to approve
only so much of a finding of guilty of' a particular offense as involves
a finding of guilty of a lesser included offense when, in the opinion of
the authority having power to approve, the evidence of record requires
a finding of only the lesser degree of guilt; and
"(b) The power to approve or disapprove the whole or any part
of the sentence."
Art. 48 requires the approval of the President in addition to that
of the commanding officer in certain cases, but in no particular confers any greater powers upon the latter than are conferred by Article
47 upon the former.
Art. 49. "The power to confirm the sentence of a court-martial
shall be held to include:
"(a) The power to approve or disapprove a finding, and to confirni
so much only of a finding of guilty of a particular offense as involves
a finding of guilty of a lesser included offense when, in the opinion of
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conceded that in America, at any rate, the military is subordinate
to the civil authority, and that where Congress has acted its action
is final and conclusive. It would also seem, though the military
authorities appear to doubt the premise, that even in military
matters Congress itself must act within and not outside of the
constitution.
General Crowder, it is true, justifies the practice by saying
that"the reviewing authority, ordinarily the commanding officer who
has convened the court, represents essentially a first appellate
stage. No sentence of a court-martial can be carried into execution until it has been approved by the reviewing authority, i. e.,
neither acquittal nor conviction is effective until the reviewing
authority has scrutinized the record and given it approval. The
very object of this institution is to secure the due application
of the law and to surround the accused with an additional protection independent of the trial court." 12
But is not this true of the presiding judge in the ordinary
criminal action? It is for him to receive the verdict and to
render judgment upon it. Even where the jury is by statute
given the power to fix the penalty, it is for him to announce it
and to sentence the prisoner. In spite of an adverse verdict, he
may still entertain a motion in arrest of judgment for the causes
authorized by the law. Wherein does the commanding officer
or reviewing authority exercise any other or different powers?
Even if the commanding officer is a part -of the appellate
machinery, where in our criminal procedure or criminal history
is an appellate court authorized or where has it assumed to possess the power to set aside a verdict of acquittal?
It ig also true that in an opinion rendered in 1853 AttorneyGeneral Cushing justified the practice on the theory that such a
review was not a new trial, as no new testimony was taken;
but this opinion, if authority at all, is practically the only authority
in favor of the position, and its sophistry is of course apparent.
the authority having power to confirm, the evidence of record requires

a finding of only the lesser degree of guilt; and
"(b) The power to confirm or disapprove the whole or any part of
the sentence."

Art. 50. "The power to order the execution of the sentence
adjudged by a court-martial shall be held to include, inter alia, the
power to mitigate or remit the whole or any part of the sentence . . .
12 See note 6, ante.
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"A new trial," the Attorney General said, "is a rehearing of the
case. A court-martial on revisal does not rehear the case: it
only reconsiders the record for the purpose of correcting or
modifying any conclusions thereon. The true analogy of such
a revisal, .......
is the case of a jury sent out by the court
to reconsider its verdict." 13 But where, in the administration
of the criminal law, has a judge been allowed to send back a
jury to reconsider a verdict of not guilty? The revisal may
possibly not be, technically speaking, a new trial, and perhaps
is not forbidden by the 40th Article of War, but what of the
constitutional provision in relation to former jeopardy? Did not
the learned Attorney Genex-al confuse civil with criminal causes?
It is admitted also in the opinion referred to that the views
expressed did not agree with the then prevailing practice nor
with a former ruling of the Attorney General's department.
'a Case of Captain Voorhees, (Oct. 27, 1853) 6 Opinions Atty.
Gen. 200.
Attorney-General Cushing, among other things, said:
"It is laid down as a thing not open to controversy, in all the
books of military law, that the superior authority may order a courtmartial to reassemble to revise its proceedings, and its sentence.
(Hough on Courts-Martial, p. 29; i McArthur on Courts-Martial, p.
136; Griffith's Notes, p. 90; Kennedy on Courts-Martial, p. 229, 290;
Anon., Observations on Courts-Martial, p. 38-65; Tytler's Mil. Law,
p. 170-338; James' Collection, p. 556; Simmons' Practice. 389; De Hart
on Courts-Martial, p. 203; O'Brien's Mil. Laws, ch. 23.)
"Revisal by court-martial is not a case of new trial. If it were,
it would, in the present case, be unlawful. The 5th Article of Amendment of the Constitution, provides that 'No person shall be subject
for the same offence, to be put twice in jeopardy of life or limb.' This
provision is in accordance with a well-known doctrine of the law of
England, to the same effect. That is to say, by the common law,
as understood and administered both in England and the United
States, there cannot be a new trial at the instance of the Government,
in a case of treason or felony, though there may be in case of misdemeanor, where a party is alleged to be improperly convicted, but not
where he has been acquitted. (i Chitty's Com. L. p. 664 and note.)
We may admit for the argument's sake, that this doctrine applies to
trials by court-martial, as well as by the civil judicature. Indeed,
Mr. Attorney-General Wirt has given an official opinion, that though
there may be a new trial by court-martial, on application of the party.
yet it cannot be lawfully ordered in invitum. (Opinions, ante vol. i, p.
233, September 16th, 1818: see, also, United States v. Gibert and Others,
ii Sumner, 19.)
"But the present, I repeat, is not a case of a new trial. A new
trial is a rehearing of the case. A court-martial on revisal does not
rehear the case: it only reconsiders the record for the purpose of
correcting or modifying any conclusions thereon. The true analogy
of such a revisal, to take an example from the practice of civil courts,
is the case of a jury sent out by the court to reconsider its verdict.
Such is the whole current of authorities, as well in the United States
as in Great Britain."
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The prior ruling was made by Attorney-General William Wirt,
in 1818, in the case of Captain Nathaniel N. Hall. Among other
things he said:
"The court, under the opinion of the judge advocate, refused
to arraign Captain Hall, on the ground that lie had been previously tried by a court-martial on the same charge, and that a
new trial was forbidden by the 87th Article of War. The general order prefixed to this report show\-s that the sentence of
the first court, which cashiered this officer, was disapproved by
the President: and it appears by the proceedings that the new
trial ordered, by a court composed of different members, was an
act of mercy to the party accused, in consonance with his wishes,
. . The question presented for my
and at his own desire..
opinion is, whether a President of the United States has the
right, under these circumstances, to order a new trial?
"The court, in this case. was a general court-martial; and its
sentence one which extended to the dismission of a commissioned
officer: it could not, therefore, according to this law, be carried
into effect until the sentence, with the whole proceedings which
led to it, should be laid before the President, who was authorized
by the law either to direct it to be carried into execution, or
otherwise, as he should judge proper. To show the value of
this appellate power, according to the spirit of this nation from
the period of its earliest struggles for liberty, it is not unworthy
of remark, that, by the 18th section of the rules and articles
of war, established by the continental Congress. it was provided
'that the continental general commanding in either of the American States for the time being shall have full power of appointing
general courts-martial to be held, and of pardoning and mitigating any of the punishments ordered to be inflicted for any
of the offences mentioned in the aforementioned rules and articles
for the better government of the troops, except the punishment
of offenders under the sentence of death by a general courtmartial, which he may order to be suspended until the pleasure
of Congress can be known; which suspension, with the proceedings of the court-martial, he shall immediately transmit to
Congress for their determination.' (1 Graydon's Digest, app.
156-7.) On the 27th May, 1777, the whole appellate power was
given to the general or commander-in-chief, id. ib., confirmed
by an order of 18th June, 1777. Some years after the close of
the revolutionary war (to wit, on the 31st May, 1786), it was
resolved by Congress, among other things that 'no sentence of
a general court-martial, in time of peace, extending to the loss
of life, the dismission of a commissioned officer, or which shall,
either in time of peace or war, respect a general officer, shall
be carried into execution, until after the whole proceeding shall
have been transmitted to the Secretarv of War, to be laid before
Congress for their confirmation or disapproval and their orders
in the same.' (1 Graydon, app. 158-9.) The question may as
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well be asked here as elsewhere, whether the appellate power
of the continental Congress, in the resolution last quoted, was
limited to the confirmation or disapproval of the sentence of the
court-martial on which they were called to act? Had they not
the power, not merely of disapproving that sentence, but of
ordering a new trial? If they were so limited, why did not
the resolution stop at giving them the power to confirm or disapprove? Why the* additional words, after the disapproval, 'and
their orders in the same'? These words obviously mean something; and what they do mean, we shall discover bv turning our
attention for a moment to the prototype from which we have
chiefly drawn all our laws, both civil and military, and from
which our then recent connexion with Great Britain rendered
it most natural that we should draw them.
"The mutiny act -of England, which annually passed, and
which is the sole foundation and rule of courts-martial in that
country, establishes a connexion between the martial and civil
courts of the kingdom, and authorizes an appeal from the former
to the latter. The 79th section of the mutiny act authorizes
an appeal from the sentence of a court-martial to the Courts
of King's Bench and Common Pleas in England and Ireland,
and the Court of Sessions in Scotland. (Tytler's Essay on
Military Law, &c., p. 167-'8: Edinburgh edition 1800.) The
causes for which the sentence of a court-martial may be brought
under review of a superior judicature, are the same which in
the civil courts of England authorize either the granting of a
new trial, or an arrest of judgment; that is to say, if the sentence or verdict shall have been manifestly without or contrary
to evidence, &c., &c.
"It appears, therefore, that in England the power to award
a new trial does exist, by an appeal from the courts-martial to
the civil courts of the kingdom. But there is something still
more strong in this view of the subject: which is. that this appeal
lies to the civil courts of the kingdom; and this power of awarding a new trial exists after the king shall have approved the
sentence -of the court-martial: for, never until then is the sentence complete and final, and never, therefore, until then, can
there be an appeal; since an appeal lies from a final sentence
only.
"It cannot be doubted that our Congress were in full possession, by painful experience, of the mutiny act, and of the whole
laws of the British army, at the period of our Revolution. ...
Can it be believed that, actin- in this spirit, and with these
enlarged views of hiuman liberty, they would have narrowed the
rights and privileges of the American citizen, and surrendered
him to a military despotism more severe than that which they
were throwing off? And yet this must be supposed, if the peace
resolution of the Congress of 1786, above quoted, is to be construed as limited to a cold rejection of the sentence of a courtmartial, without the milder and more conciliating remedy of a
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new trial, which they knew to exist under the British law;
because the rejection would still leave the party under the
ignominy of the sentence of his brother officer, without a hope
of wiping out the reproach, and reduce the power of Congress
to a power (most humiliating to the prisoner) of pardoning a
condemned culprit. Looking on the subject in this light, I cannot doubt that, by the words of the resolution of 1786, above
quoted, 'for their confirmation or disapproval, and their orders
in the same,' it was the intention of Congress to lodge in that
body all the conciliating powers, over sentences of courts-martial,
which they must have known to exist in the different branches
of the government of England. For if Congress did not intend
by this resolution to reserve to themselves this power, amolg
others, of awarding a new trial, no other tribunal of this country
could then have possessed it. We had then no national courts,
corresponding with the King's Bench, &c., to whom the power
of awarding new trials is given in England; much less any
connexion established by law between such courts and the courtsmartial of the country.

Congress were forced by the emergency of the
crisis to assume, in some instances, legislative, executive, and
judicial power; or, in other words, to take care of the republic
relation to the army particularly. Having no national
-in
court, they were forced to divide the government of that between
the republican generals and themselves: and, in relation to an
army composed of their fellow-citizens struggling for the common liberty, and alive, in every nerve, to'all that concerned their
honor, it cannot be doubted that every power, whose exercise
was essential to that honor, was intended to be preserved by
the broad expressions which have been quoted. That they could
have done all, therefore, which the court of the King's Bench.
&c., could have done for the relief of the injured honor of the
army, I have no doubt.
"The power which Congress possessed before the formation
of the present government was, obviously, intended to be transferred to the President after its formation. This will be evident
by comparing the congressional resolution of 1786 with the
language of the act of Congress first quoted.

.

.

. What

answer can be given, but that the desigfi was to comprehend,
under this clause, all the power which had been long known to
exist in England, over sentences of courts-martial pronounced
in that country? and, among these, (as shown under the English
mutiny act by Tytler,) the power of reviewing them and giving
a new trial. And where is the injury, in any quarter, by the
existence of such a power? The benefit of an appellate tribunal
is obvious, while human nature shall remain as imperfect as it
is: not so, I think, the final power of the tribunal first convened.
On the contrary, the dangers of this latter principle are incalculable; it surrenders the victim, bound hand and foot, to the
malice, revenge, and corruption of his enemies.
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"The argument presented by the judge advocate and the
court-martial at Plattsburg, against the new trial, strikes me as
being founded rather .onthe letter than on the spirit of the 87th
article of the rules and articles of war. That article is in the
following words: 'No person shall be sentenced to suffer death,
but-by the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of a general
court-martial nor except in the cases herein expressly mentioned;
nor shall more than fifty lashes be inflicted on any offender, at
the discretion of a court-martial; and no officer, non-commissioned officer, soldier, or follower of the army, shall be tried a
second time for the same offence.' It is very apparent that the
whole of this article is designed for the benefit of the party
accused, not for his prejudice; and yet the constructive operation
given to it, in this case, is for his prejudice -only, and not for
his benefit. There is no principle in law better settled than that
a party has the right to waive a rule designed merely for his
own benefit. The writers on martial law have labored, very
laudably, to reconcile the principles of proceeding 'in this law
with those of the common law of England; and there is not a
lawyer who can read this article without seeing in it the commonlaw rule in criminal trials, from which it has flowed.
But do these maxims, which form the rule of the common law,
(and' consequently of the martial law, which is borrowed from
it,) bar a new trial, on the motion, and in behalf, of the accused?
Blackstone shall answer: 'Yet, in many instances, where, contrary to evidence, the jury have found the prisoner guilty, their
verdict hath been mercifully set aside, and a new trial granted
by the court of King's Bench, &c. But there hath been, yet,
no instance of granting a new trial, where the prisoner was
acquitted on the first.'

(4th

Black., 361.)

.

.

.

. It

is

enough for our purpose that the prisoner has long had this
right, and that the rule which forbids a second trial, devised
purely for his benefit, has never been considered as being infringed
by granting such a new trial on his motion: that he has invariably
had. this new trial, whenever, in the estimation of those constituted to judge, the reason and equity of the case have required
it. . . . It will be observed that the rule is altogether benignant to the party accused. It does not follow that, if acquitted,
he can be arraigned anew; it is not (according to Blackstone)
that the new trial can be ordered against him-it is only for
him. What just ground of alarm, therefore, can there be to the
officers of the army, that a principle, exclusively beneficent in
its operation, should exist?-one which can operate in their
favor; and never, by any possibility, can operate against
them? ......
"Upon the whole, I am of the opinion that the President of
the United States is vested by the laws with the power of ordering a new trial for the benefit of the prisoner." 14
14 Case of Nathaniel N. Hall, 1 Ops. Atty. GCen. 149.
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This opinion clearly limits the new trial to one at the request
of and for the benefit of the defendant, and to one which is
granted at his request and at his request alone.
The practice also is expressly denied, not only by the only
American writers upon the subject, but by writers whose autbority the military have always recognized.
Colonel -William Winthrop, in his work on military law,
says:
"The Plea of Former Trial for the Same Offence. Similar
at Military and at Criminal Law. This is the plea by which an
accused party avails himself of the principle incorporated in the
102d Article of the military code, viz :-'No person shall be tried
a second time for the same offence.'
"In the criminal procedure the defendant takes advantage of
this principle by means of one of the two pleas of former
acquittal, (autrefois acquit,) or former conviction, (autrefois
conuict).

.

. . The rulings thereupon by the civil courts will

therefore be applicable to .similar cases at military law.
"Former Trial and 'Jeopardy' Identical. That no man shall
be liable to be twice tried or punished for the same offence, was
an ancient maxim -of the common law, . . . . it was incorporated in the Constitution of the United States in a form similar
to that in which it originally appears in the early cases and
writings in criminal law, as follows-'nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb.'

.

.

.

That it takes this form is explained by the

fact that, at the period of its origin, all the considerable offences
in regard to which this right of defence would be asserted were
felonies punishable capitally or by dismemberment. In the present state of the law, indeed, the provision, as worded in the
Constitution, applies, strictly, to but two or three crimes, as
treason, murder, and piracy; but, construing it in the light of
its original bearing and its manifest spirit, the U. S. courts
generally have viewed it as covering in principle all other crimes,
and have held the phrase 'put in jeopardy' to mean practically
the same as tried, thus giving to such provision substantially
the effect of the declaration expressed in the military statute.
"Meaning of 'Tried' and 'Trial.' In so ruling, these courts
have further held that the 'jeopardy' or 'trial' means the prosecution of a case to a verdict; that unless the case has proceeded
at least to an acquittal or a conviction, there has been no trial
and therefore no jeopardy. Similarly the word 'tried' in Art.
102 is to be interpreted as meaning duly prosecuted before a
court-martial to a legal conviction or acquittal. After such a conclusion the Article prohibits a further trial of the accused except,
33Winthrop, 2nd ed., I, p. 387 et seq.
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(as will hereafter be indicated), by his own waiver and consent.
"Immaterial Whether There Has Been a Sentence Adjudged.
It is further held by the weight of authority that, to complete
the trial, no judgment or sentence is requisite. Thus, while in
the military procedure a -sentence properly follows at once and
as a matter of course upon a conviction, a court-martial will
properly hold an accused to have been 'tried' in the sense of the
102d Article, when he has been duly acquitted or convicted,
without regard to whether, in a case of conviction, a sentence
or a legal sentence has been adjudged.
"Immaterial Whether Any or What Action Has Been Taken
on the Proceedings by the Reviewing Officer. Further. where
the accused in a military case has been once duly acquitted or
convicted, he has been 'tried' in the sense of the Article, although
no action may have been taken upon the finding or proceedings
by the reviewing authority. Nor has he been any the less 'tried'
where the finding has been formally disapproved, by such authority. For the finding is no less a consummation in law of the
trial,though, from a cause beyond the control both of the accused
and the court, such finding has been rendered ineffectual."
In the same connection, and in speaking of Section 40 of the
Articles -of War, which provides that no person shall be tried a
second time for the same offence, M'[ajor General George B.
Davis says: 1
"The Constitution declares that 'no person shall be subjected for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb.' The United States courts, in treating the term 'put
in jeopardy' as meaning practically tried, hold that the 'jeopardy'
indicated 'can be interpreted to mean nothing short of the acquittal or conviction of the prisoner and the judgment of the court
thereon.' So it has been held that the term 'tried', employed
in this Article, meant duly prosecuted, before a court-martial, to
a final conviction or acquittal; and therefore that an officer or
soldier, after having been duly convicted or acquitted by such
a court, could not be subjected to a second military trial for the
same offense, except by and upon his own waiver and consent.
For that the accused may waive objection to a second trial was
held by Attorney-General Wirt in 1818, and has since been
regarded as settled law.
"Where the accused has been once duly convicted or acquitted he has been 'tried' in the sense of the Article, and cannot be
tried again, against his will, though no action whatever be taken
upon the proceedings by the reviewing authority, or though the
proceedings, findings (and sentence, if any), be wholly disapproved by him. It is immaterial whether the former conviction
or acquittal is approved or disapproved.
16 Davis. Military Law, 3rd ed., p. 533.
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"Where an officer or soldier has been duly acquitted or convicted of a specific offense, he cannot, against his consent, be
brought to trial for a minor offense included therein, and an
.acquittal or conviction of which was necessarily involved in the
finding upon the original charge. Thus a party convicted or
acquitted of a desertion cannot afterwards be brought to trial
for an absence without leave committed in and by the same
act.
"That an accused has been, in the opinion of the reviewing
authority, inadequately sentenced, either by a general or an
inferior court, cannot except his case from the application of
this Article; though insufficiently punished, he cannot be tried
again for the same offense."
Nor has the Supreme Court at any time sustained the constitutionality of such a practice. All that it has ever done has
been to say that the practice prevails, and that the point cannot
be raised or inquired into in a collateral proceeding or on a
habeas corpus.
The case of Swaim v. United States 17 was one in which a

claim was filed in the Court of Claims for the allowance of the
pay of a Brigadier General in spite of a judgment of a courtmartial suspending the officer from his rank and forfeiting his
17 (1897)

165 U. S. 553. 41 L. Ed. 823, 17 S. C. R. 448.

The court

in its opinion and in reviewing prior authorities also said:
"It was said by this court in Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 82,,
that 'with the -sentences of courts-martial which have been convened
regularly, and have proceeded regularly, and by which punishments
are directed, not forbidden by law, or which are according to the law
and customs of the sea, civil courts have nothing to do, nor are they
in any way alterable by them ..
"Keyes v. United States, 109 U. S. 336, was, like the present, a
suit in the Court of Claims to recover back pay alleged to have been
wrongfully retained by reason of an illegal judgment of a courtmartial, and the rule was laid down thus: 'That the court-martial, as

a general court-martial, had cognizance of the charges made, and
had jurisdiction of the person of the appellant, is not disputed. This
being so, whatever irregularities or errors are alleged to have occurred
in the proceedings, the sentence must be held valid when it is questioned in this collateral way,' but where there is no law authorizing

the court-martial, or where the statutory conditions as to the constitution or jurisdiction of the court are not observed, there is no
tribunal authorized by law to render the judgment."
That such judgments may not be collaterally attacked, see Dynes
v. Hoover, (1859) 20 How. (U.S.) 65, 82, 15 L. Ed. 839; Ex parte
Mason, (1882) 105 U. S. 696, 26 L. Ed. 1213; Smith v. Whitney, (1886)
116 U. S. 167, 177, 179, 29 L. Ed. 601, 6 S. C. R. 570; Ex parte Kearney.
(1822) 7 Wheat. (U. S.) 37, 5 L. Ed. 391; Ex parte Watkins, (1829)
3 Pet. (U.'S.) 193. 7 L. Ed. 650; Ex parte Milligan, (1866) 4 Wall.
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pay. Nowhere in this opinion was the constitution referred to.
Mr. Justice Shiras in speaking for the court said:
"It is claimed that the action of the President in thus twice
returning the proceedings to the court-martial, urging a more
severe sentence, was without authority of law, and that the said
last sentence having resulted from such illegal conduct was absolutely void. This contention is based upon the proposition that
the provision in the British Mutiny Act, which was in force in
this country at the time and prior to the American Revolution,
and which regulates proceedings in courts-martial, is applicable.
This provision was as follows: 'The authority having power
to confirm the findings and sentence of a court-martial, may send
back such findings and sentence, or either of them, for revision
once, but not more than once, and it shall not be lawful for the
court on any revision to receive any additional evidence, and
when the proceedings only are sent back for revision the court
shall have power, without any direction, to revise the sentence
also. In no case shall the authority recommend the increase of a
sentence, nor shall the court-martial, on revisal of the sentence,
either in obedience to the recommendation of the authority or
for any other reason, have the power to increase the sentence
awarded.'

"Even if it be conceded that this provision of the British
Mutiny Act was at any time operative in this country, the subject
is now covered by the Army Regulations, 1881, Section 923,
relied upon by the Attorney General in his letter to the President
and cited by the Court of Claims, which is as follows:
" 'When a court-martial appears to have erred in any respect,
the reviewing authority may reconvene the court for a consideration of its action, with suggestions for its guidance. The
court may thereupon, should it concur in the views submitted,
proceed to remedy the errors pointed out, and may modify or
completely change its findings. The object of reconvening the
court in such a case is to afford it an opportunity to reconsider
the record for the purpose of correcting or modifying any conclusions thereupon, and to make any amendments of the record
necessary to perfect it.'
"This regulation would seem to warrant the course of conduct followed in the present case. Tn Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S.
13, a somewhat similar contention was made. There a courtmartial had imposed a sentence which was transmitted with the
(U. S.) 2, 18 L. Ed. 281; Ex parte Reed, (1879) 100 U. S. 13, 25 L. Ed.
538; Johnson v. Sayre, (1895) 158 U. S. 109, 39 L. Ed. 914, 15 S. C.
R. 773.
That a writ of prohibition 'will not lie, see Smith v. Whitney,
supra.
That an appeal, writ of error, or habeas corpus will not lie, see
Ex parte Kearney, supra.
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record to Admiral Nichols, the revising officer, who returned it
with a letter stating that the finding was in accordance with the
evidence, but that he differed with the court as to the adequacy
of the sentence. The court revised the sentence and substituted
another and more severe sentence, which was approved. The
accused filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court;
and it was claimed that the court had exhausted its powers in
making the first sentence, and, also, that it was not competent
for the court-martial to give effect to the views of the revising
officer by imposing a second senteilce of more severity. The
Navy Regulations were cited to the effect that the authority who
ordered the court was competent to direct it to reconsider its
proceedings and sentence for the purpose of correcting any
mistake which may have been committed, but that it was not
within the power of the revising authority to compel a court
to change its sentence, where, upon being reconvened by him,
they have refused to modify it, nor directly or indirectly to
enlarge the measure of punishment imposed by sentence of a
court-martial.
"This court held that such regulations have the force of
law, but that as the court-martial had jurisdiction over the person
and the case, its proceedings could not be collaterally impeached
for any mere error or irregularity committed within the sphere
of its authority: that the matters complained of were within the
jurisdiction of the court-martial; that the second sentence was
not void; and, accordingly, the application for a writ of habeas
corpus was denied. We agree with Court of Claims that the
ruling in Ex parte Reed, in principle, decides the present
question."
The case of Ex parte Reed s was also one in which the
Supreme Court refused relief, but merely on the ground that
a writ of habeas corpus would not lie. The case was one where
a sentence had been increased on the revision. The constitution
was not commented upon or even mentioned in the -opinion.'
Nor is there an justification or support for the practice to
20
be found in the case of Runkle v. United States, to which
Colonel Read referred in his testimony before the American
Bar Association. 2 ' That case, indeed, is opposed to, rather than
supports, the position of the military authorities. It took the
18 Note 17, ante.

19 See note 17, ante.
20 (1887) 122 U. S. 543, 30 L. Ed. 1167, 7 S. C. R. 1141. Nor is there
any justification for it in the case of Ex parte Milligan, (1866) 4 Wall.
(U.S.) 2, 18 L. Ed. 281, which is sometimes referred to.
21 See note 5, ante.
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position that court-martial proceedings are judicial and not
administrative, and, if judicial, one would naturally infer that
judicial principles should ordinarily prevail. All that the case
held was that until the President had acted in the manner
required by Article 65 of the Articles of War, contained in the
Act of April 10, 1806, the judgment of a court-martial was
inoperative and that, there being no sufficient evidence that the
action of the court-martial which dismissed Major Runkle from
the service was approved by the President, it followed that he
was never legally cashiered or dismissed from the army. The
Article of War provided that "neither shall any sentence of a
general court-martial, in time of peace, extending to the loss of
life, or the dismission of a commissioned officer, or which shall,
either in time of peace or war, respect a general officer, be
carried into execution, until after the whole proceedings shall
have been transmitted to the Secretary of War, to be laid before
the President of the United States, for his confirmation or disapproval, and orders, in the case." It was held that the action
required by the President was judicial in its character and not
administrative, and had to be performed by him and by him
alone, and that in order that the sentence might be operative,
his approval must be authenticated in a way to show otherwise
than argumentatively that it is the result of his judgment, and
not a mere departmental order which may or may not have
attracted his attention, and that the fact that the order is his
own must not be left to inference only.
"Here, however, [the court says] the action required of the
President is judicial in its character, not administrative. As
Commander-in-Chief of the Army he has been made by law
the person whose duty it is to review the proceedings of courtsmartial in cases of this kind. This implies that he himself is
to consider the proceedings laid before him and decide personally whether they ought to be carried into effect. Such a power
he can not delegate. His personal judgment is required, as
much so as it would have been in passing on the case, if he bad
been one of the members of the court-martial itself. He may
call others to his assistance in making his examinations and in
informing himself as to what ought to be done, but his judgment, when pronounced, must be his own judgment and not that
of another."
If this be true of the action of the President in reviewing the
judgment of a court-martial and in determining whether the
judgment shall be carried into execution or not, much m6re
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must it be true of the action of the court-martial itself, before
which alone the defendant may be tried and which alone is
intrusted with the power of determining the guilt of the accused
and of fixing his penalty. The Articles of War either expressly
impose the penalty or provide that it shall be such "as the courtmartial may direct." When it comes to the matter of review
and to the question whether the sentence shall be put into execution, the determination of this question is, it is true, conferred
upon the reviewing officers alone. They to this extent are
members of the court-martial and a part of the military judicial
system. Further than this we believe we cannot go. The proceedings have been declared by the Supreme Court to be judicial
and not administrative. The court-martial is not merely a subordinate ministerial body. It is the only forum before which the
prisoner can be tried. It is the only forum which can pass
upon his guilt. When before it, the prisoner is in jeopardy.
Under every principle of law and of the constitution, its decision
should be followed.
Nor is there any historical basis for the assumption of the
power complained of. .Article 5 of the amendments itself negatives it, for its limitations are confined merely to the indictment
or presentment by a grand jury, which are of course inapplicable
to military proceedings, but whether inapplicable or not are
denied to the military offender by express terms, while the protection of no other clause of the constitution is so denied him.
It is quite clear that the states were jealou§ of the new
government which they were creating and above all determined
that it should have no powers which were greater than the
exigency demanded. Everywhere they showed a peculiar solicitude for personal liberty and for the guaranties of Magna
Charta. It is true they did not go to the extent of the Mutiny
Act and provide that all regulations for the conduct of the army
should be yearly enacted by the legislative body, and should thus
be taken from the control of the monarch, but they certainly
hedged constitutional limitations around the powers granted to
the new sovereign, the United States, which took the place of
the English sovereign. In England it was perhaps necessary
that the Mutiny Act should be yearly enacted as a constant
reminder that the right to maintain a standing army was not a
royal prerogative, and, as there is in England strictly speaking
no written constitution, such a reminder may be necessary. Here,
however, we have a written constitution and a federal govern-
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ment of delegated and not original powers. Even Congress has
no powers except those which are expressly delegated to it or
which are necessary to the exercise of those delegated. Here
we have no royal prerogative. The constitution is the source
of all power and its limitations are all-controlling. Here indeed
the law of the land which is mentioned in the Mutiny Act, but
which in England is more or less indefinite, is made clear and
certain by the first ten amendments, or the so-called American
declaration of rights.
The military authorities, in short, in acting contrary to the
opinion of their own text writers and in following the opinion
of Attorney-General Cushing instead of that of Attorney-General
Wirt, and Judge Advocate General Crowder in coming to his
conclusion, have utterly failed to recognize the fact that the military law of the United States has always been under the control
of Congress and of *the constitution and has known no royal
or presidential prerogative and that to Congress and not to the
President or any commanding -officer is given the power to make
rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces.2 2 It is as the law now is in England since the passage
of the Mutiny Act of 1879 and not as it was in England before
or even after the passage of the Mutiny Act of 1689.
"The history of English military law up to 1879 may be
divided into three periods, each having a distinct constitutional
aspect: (1) that prior to 1610, when the army, being regarded
as so many personal retainers of the sovereign rather than
servants of the state, was mainly governed by the will of the
sovereign; (2) that between 1689 and 1803, when the army,
being recognized as a permanent force, was governed within the
realm by statute and without it by the prerogative of the crown,
and (3) that from 1803 to 1879, when it was governed either
directly by statute or by the sovereign under an authority derived
from and defined and limited by statute." 23
Our forefathers, indeed, were fresh from the English revolutions and the English experiences. They chose to repudiate the
theory of the Mutiny Act of 1689 and to anticipate that of 1879.
Even if we accept the theory that the spirit and not the
words of the amendments apply, then surel.y the spirit is not
22 Art. I, Sec. 8.
23 Enc. Britannica, 9th ed., Vol. XVI, p. 296.
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complied with by the practice that is adopted. Is not the whole
history of the development of English law, at any rate as far
as criminal trials are concerned, a struggle for the independence
of the jury and freedom from executive and even judicial restraint? Would the people who had built bonfires and held
popular celebrations in honor of the acquitted bishops and of the
jury that acquitted them, have tolerated for a moment a system
which should have made those juries subordinate to the royal
power and put it into the hands of the judges or royal representatives to call them together again, tell them that they disapproved of the acquittal, that they, the summoners, were satisfied
of the guilt of the accused, that the jury was remiss in its duty,
and allowed them to send the jury back to reconsider their
verdict? Attorney-General Cushing in his opinion in the case
of Captain Voorhees 24 suggests that the practice adopted by
the military authorities is not different from that which would
prevail if a judge sent back a verdict to a jury in a criminal
case. But when, at any rate since the English revolution, has
there been an instance of any case in which this has been tolerated
in a criminal action when a verdict of not guilty has been
rendered? It may be that an uncertain verdict may be made
certain. If, for instance, a jury should return a verdict of
"guilty on some of the counts of the information and not guilty
on others," they might be required to state definitely those on
which the guilt had been determined, but we find no instance
where the law has gone any further.
The question is, is the man to be tried by the members of
the court-martial or by the commanding officer alone? If by
the latter, why the rigid requirements as to members,, oaths, and
challenges? The commanding officer is a superior officer. The
prospects and chances of preferment of the inferior officers who
sit on the courts-martial are largely in his hands. His recommendati-ons to the war department are the only recommendations
of record. It is he alone who can usually mention a man in
the dispatches. Is such a jury or tribunal free and untrammeled
and unbiased in its second review, when the case is sent back
to it with the comment that the commanding officer disapproves
of its decision and of its sentence and is displeased with its
action? It is true that its members need not alter their former
judgment. There is, however, every temptation to them to do so.
24

See note 13, ante.
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The military authorities, in short, ignore the constitution and
insist upon looking upon the courts-martial as executive Agencies rather than courts of justice; the administration of the
military criminal law as a means to enforce discipline, and the
law itself as a compilation -of military rules, rather than a
declaration of primary rights, duties, and obligations. This is
clear from the comment and order of General Bell in the case
of the recruit David Cortesini, which we have before referred
to and which was approved by General Crowder in his testimony
before the Senate committee, " and which was as follows:
"In the present case the accused was given every opportunity
to obey the order, but nevertheless disobeyed it intentionally,
in defiance of authority, and accordingly sdich disobedience was
'willful" within the meaning of this section.
"The reviewing authority does not intend to give the impression that he personally believes that the accused must be required
to serve a long period of confinement for this act, but rather
he desires the court to understand that the commission of this
act should be met by severe punishment, and then, if in this
case there are reasons why the sentence should be reduced, such
reduction should be ordered on the action of the reviewing
authority rather than in the inadequate sentence awarded by a
court appointed as an executive agency in the administration
of discipline."
The case was one where an ignorant Italian refused to sign
an enlistment and assignment card. He pleaded guilty to refusing to obey the order, but claimed that the same was unlawful.
The' court-martial acquitted him. On the revision which was
ordered, he was found guilty and sentenced to a dishonorable
discharge and to confinement for five years. This sentence was,
it is true, reduced by the commanding officer to confinement for
one month and forfeiture of one-third of his pay for that period.
It may be that the punishment was richly deserved. It was a
case, however, where the court-martial was treated as an agency
subject to the commands of its superior, and not as a court of
justice, and the prisoner was not tried by the court-martial but
by the commanding officer, and this in spite of Article 64 of
the Articles of War, which expressly provides that such an
offender shall "suffer death, or other such punishment as a
court-martial [not the commanding officer] may direct." Will
the American people ever be willing that their sons who, in the
.5See note 2, ante.
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future, shall volunteer out of sheer patriotism in the cause of
their country shall be deemed to have relinquished all constitutional rights and be subject to be punished or acquitted for
every offense merely as their commanding officers may direct?
We realize that the system of a jury of one's peers can hardly
exist in the army, though the old British system recognized a
right to an appeal to such a jury in extreme cases .2-6 We are,
however, stretching the strict language of the constitution when
we deny that right, for the restriction of the first ten amendments is only made expressly to cover the presentment or indictment by a grand jury; but surely the ordinary rules of jeopardy
and due process of law were intended to apply. It is inconceivable that a people wlo had cognizance of the bloody assizes and
of a Judge Jefferies who was told by his monarch how to judge
and how to rule, and in turn forced his juries to do likewise,
would ever consent to such a practice even under the pressure of
military exigency.
Nowhere in speaking of the reviewing power do the Articles
of War suggest that a rehearing may be ordered, nor that any
resubmission or recommendation may be made to the courtmartial. Nowhere even is the word "recommendation" used.
The articles merely provide that no sentence shall be carried
into execution unless approved. Is there anywhere any intimation that a new trial may be ordered or a revision of the record
by the court-martial may be suggested, and a verdict of guilty
substituted for that of not guilty? The practice is nothing but
an arbitrary assumption of- power.
It may do no great harm. It may be that in the great majority
of cases the courts-martial adhere to their former decisions. In
some cases, however, they do not. At' any rate, it shocks the
legal sense of the practicing lawyer; it is violative of basic constitutional rights; it furnishes grounds for the charge that the
constitution protects all except those who fight beneath our flag,
and this charge we cannot allow to be made. If in the future
we would raise armies and hope to have men volunteer, we
must make it clear that the country's "uniform is not the soldier
man's disgrace," and that, though while in the army he must
submit to restrictions not encountered in civil life because not
there necessary to the public weal, his basic constitutional rights
26
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will nevertheless be respected. The practice should definitely
be declared unlawful and should be discontinued.
The sense of fair play is bred into the bone and sinew of
the Anglo-Saxon, and the Anglo-Saxon is, above all things, a
sportsman. He will submit to anything if he thinks it is according to the rules of the game. When, however, "the Anglo-Saxon
shakes his head like an ox in the stall and says it is not fair,
then, my son, it is time to beware."
A bald fact is apparent and that is that a practice has been
allowed to prevail in the army of the United States which is
fundamentally unjust and fundamentally and unquestionably
unconstitutional, and has been recognized by the military authorities and enforced by them, and believed by them to be legal,
merely because -our rules of judicial procedure were such that
its validity could not be properly inquired into by the civil courts.
The military courts in the cases passed upon were properly
organized and had jurisdiction of the person and of the subject
matter, and therefore the point raised could not be raised in
habeas corpus or in any other collateral proceeding. It could
not be raised on appeal or by writ of error because in America
(though not in England) no appeal or writ of error from or tb
the civil courts from the judgments of courts-martial is provided
for, and the right to an appeal is not a constitutional right.
The Supreme Court of the nation has conceded that such a
practice prevails. It has never decided that it is constitutional.
It is not.
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